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<rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" version="2.0"><channel><title>任白的小站</title><link>https://blog.wrjcloud.cn</link><atom:link href="https://blog.wrjcloud.cn/rss.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><description>网络安全技术分享平台！</description><generator>Halo v2.24.2</generator><language>zh-cn</language><lastBuildDate>Tue, 16 Jun 2026 23:48:48 GMT</lastBuildDate><item><title><![CDATA[ThinkPHP-5.0.23漏洞分析]]></title><link>https://blog.wrjcloud.cn/archives/thinkphp-5.0.23lou-dong-fen-xi</link><description><![CDATA[<img src="https://blog.wrjcloud.cn/plugins/feed/assets/telemetry.gif?title=ThinkPHP-5.0.23%E6%BC%8F%E6%B4%9E%E5%88%86%E6%9E%90&amp;url=/archives/thinkphp-5.0.23lou-dong-fen-xi" width="1" height="1" alt="" style="opacity:0;">**漏洞摘要** CVE-2018-20062是ThinkPHP 5.0/5.1分支中的高危RCE漏洞，影响5.0.23及以下和5.1.31及以下版本。漏洞源于框架通过POST的_method参数实现任意方法调用，结合构造函数变量覆盖篡改filter属性，最后利用call_user_func动态回调执行系统命令。攻击者只需构造特定Payload即可远程代码执行，无需路由或业务漏洞配合，是ThinkPHP安全审计的经典入门案例。官方已在5.0.24版本通过请求方法白名单机制进行修复。]]></description><guid isPermaLink="false">/archives/thinkphp-5.0.23lou-dong-fen-xi</guid><dc:creator>Administrator</dc:creator><enclosure url="https://blog.wrjcloud.cn/apis/api.storage.halo.run/v1alpha1/thumbnails/-/via-uri?uri=%2Fupload%2F1-WloO.png&amp;size=m" type="image/jpeg" length="469946"/><category>渗透</category><category>漏洞靶场</category><category>漏洞研究</category><category>漏洞复现</category><pubDate>Fri, 22 May 2026 15:24:36 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title><![CDATA[vulntarget-b靶场]]></title><link>https://blog.wrjcloud.cn/archives/vulntarget-bba-chang</link><description><![CDATA[<img src="https://blog.wrjcloud.cn/plugins/feed/assets/telemetry.gif?title=vulntarget-b%E9%9D%B6%E5%9C%BA&amp;url=/archives/vulntarget-bba-chang" width="1" height="1" alt="" style="opacity:0;"> 该靶机项目基于灵境平台，涵盖外网与内网渗透全流程。外网渗透通过扫描识别宝塔面板与极致CMS，利用弱口令登录后台，安装插件植入Webshell并绕过disable_functions限制，最终提权至root。内网阶段配置代理发现禅道CMS（12.4.2版本）文件上传漏洞（CNVD-2020121325），结合火绒免杀技术建立控制通道，使用CVE-2021-1732提权至管理员权限。通过域内漏洞CVE-2021-42287/42278获取域控（Windows 2016）权限，完成横向渗透。涉及漏洞含CMS利用、隧道代理、免杀技术及域控提权，实战性强且技术覆盖广。]]></description><guid isPermaLink="false">/archives/vulntarget-bba-chang</guid><dc:creator>Administrator</dc:creator><enclosure url="https://blog.wrjcloud.cn/apis/api.storage.halo.run/v1alpha1/thumbnails/-/via-uri?uri=%2Fupload%2Fpicture4-edEh.png&amp;size=m" type="image/jpeg" length="1107812"/><category>渗透</category><category>漏洞靶场</category><pubDate>Sat, 25 Apr 2026 18:17:05 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title><![CDATA[Vulnhub_NOOB_1靶场]]></title><link>https://blog.wrjcloud.cn/archives/vulnhub_noob_1ba-chang</link><description><![CDATA[<img src="https://blog.wrjcloud.cn/plugins/feed/assets/telemetry.gif?title=Vulnhub_NOOB_1%E9%9D%B6%E5%9C%BA&amp;url=/archives/vulnhub_noob_1ba-chang" width="1" height="1" alt="" style="opacity:0;"> 本文记录了一次靶场渗透测试实践。靶机部署于灵境平台（IP：192.168.242.88），通过Nmap扫描发现开放21、80、55077端口。利用FTP弱口令（ftp/ftp）获取cred.txt，解码得champ:password登录Web系统。分析Web下载的图片文件，通过steghide提取到用户凭证，结合SSH连接提权。最终利用nano工具提权至root，解码root.txt获得目标信息。整个过程需细致分析编码与隐藏文件，难度中等但经验要求较高。]]></description><guid isPermaLink="false">/archives/vulnhub_noob_1ba-chang</guid><dc:creator>Administrator</dc:creator><enclosure url="https://blog.wrjcloud.cn/apis/api.storage.halo.run/v1alpha1/thumbnails/-/via-uri?uri=%2Fupload%2Fper.png&amp;size=m" type="image/jpeg" length="886132"/><category>渗透</category><category>漏洞靶场</category><pubDate>Mon, 13 Apr 2026 15:57:06 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title><![CDATA[利用HexStrike实现AI渗透]]></title><link>https://blog.wrjcloud.cn/archives/li-yong-hexstrikeshi-xian-aishen-tou</link><description><![CDATA[<img src="https://blog.wrjcloud.cn/plugins/feed/assets/telemetry.gif?title=%E5%88%A9%E7%94%A8HexStrike%E5%AE%9E%E7%8E%B0AI%E6%B8%97%E9%80%8F&amp;url=/archives/li-yong-hexstrikeshi-xian-aishen-tou" width="1" height="1" alt="" style="opacity:0;"> HexStrike_AI是集成专业安全工具与AI代理的自动化渗透测试框架，旨在优化安全人员效率。其核心特性包括：支持50+场景化AI代理（如漏洞分析、自动化利用），内置Nmap、Sqlmap等200+工具，实现工具调用自动化；具备智能决策能力，如自动调整扫描参数或切换工具应对失败。用户可通过Trae或Cherry_Studio配置客户端连接Kali服务器，框架开源地址为GitHub（https://github.com/0x4m4/hexstrike-ai）及官网（https://www.hexstrike.com/）。]]></description><guid isPermaLink="false">/archives/li-yong-hexstrikeshi-xian-aishen-tou</guid><dc:creator>Administrator</dc:creator><enclosure url="https://blog.wrjcloud.cn/apis/api.storage.halo.run/v1alpha1/thumbnails/-/via-uri?uri=%2Fupload%2Fpaper.png&amp;size=m" type="image/jpeg" length="851542"/><category>渗透</category><pubDate>Thu, 19 Mar 2026 15:44:28 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title><![CDATA[抗量子密码技术]]></title><link>https://blog.wrjcloud.cn/archives/kang-liang-zi-mi-ma-ji-shu</link><description><![CDATA[<img src="https://blog.wrjcloud.cn/plugins/feed/assets/telemetry.gif?title=%E6%8A%97%E9%87%8F%E5%AD%90%E5%AF%86%E7%A0%81%E6%8A%80%E6%9C%AF&amp;url=/archives/kang-liang-zi-mi-ma-ji-shu" width="1" height="1" alt="" style="opacity:0;"> 量子计算的快速发展威胁着现行公钥密码体系（如RSA、ECC），因其Shor算法可在多项式时间内破解大整数分解和离散对数问题。抗量子密码通过新型数学难题（如格的短期向量、编码译码等）设计算法，NIST已正式标准化基于格的Kyber、Dilithium等方案。迁移至抗量子密码需应对密钥尺寸膨胀、性能损耗及协议适配等挑战，涉及金融、车联网、政务等关键领域。各国正加速标准化与产业化布局，构建后量子时代的网络安全防线。]]></description><guid isPermaLink="false">/archives/kang-liang-zi-mi-ma-ji-shu</guid><dc:creator>Administrator</dc:creator><enclosure url="https://blog.wrjcloud.cn/apis/api.storage.halo.run/v1alpha1/thumbnails/-/via-uri?uri=%2Fupload%2F%25E3%2580%2590%25E5%2593%25B2%25E9%25A3%258E%25E5%25A3%2581%25E7%25BA%25B8%25E3%2580%2591Chiikawa-%25E4%25B9%258C%25E8%2590%25A8%25E5%25A5%2587.png&amp;size=m" type="image/jpeg" length="480811"/><category>密码学</category><pubDate>Tue, 3 Mar 2026 15:49:27 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title><![CDATA[HTTP/HTTPS协议通信全流程]]></title><link>https://blog.wrjcloud.cn/archives/http-httpsxie-yi-tong-xin-quan-liu-cheng</link><description><![CDATA[<img src="https://blog.wrjcloud.cn/plugins/feed/assets/telemetry.gif?title=HTTP%2FHTTPS%E5%8D%8F%E8%AE%AE%E9%80%9A%E4%BF%A1%E5%85%A8%E6%B5%81%E7%A8%8B&amp;url=/archives/http-httpsxie-yi-tong-xin-quan-liu-cheng" width="1" height="1" alt="" style="opacity:0;"> 用户访问URL时，浏览器先通过DNS解析获取服务器IP：检查本地缓存后，递归查询根域名服务器、顶级域服务器及权威服务器。建立TCP三次握手后，HTTPS需进行TLS handshake：客户端与服务端协商加密算法，服务端提供CA签名的数字证书，客户端验证证书可信性（信任链、域名匹配、签名有效性），双方生成会话密钥。最后通过加密的TCP通道发送HTTP请求与响应，传输完成后通过四次挥手关闭连接，完成安全可靠的网页加载。]]></description><guid isPermaLink="false">/archives/http-httpsxie-yi-tong-xin-quan-liu-cheng</guid><dc:creator>Administrator</dc:creator><enclosure url="https://blog.wrjcloud.cn/apis/api.storage.halo.run/v1alpha1/thumbnails/-/via-uri?uri=%2Fupload%2F%25E3%2580%2590%25E5%2593%25B2%25E9%25A3%258E%25E5%25A3%2581%25E7%25BA%25B8%25E3%2580%2591%25E6%25B8%2585%25E6%2599%25A8-%25E9%259B%25AA%25E5%25B1%25B1.png&amp;size=m" type="image/jpeg" length="319764"/><category>密码学</category><pubDate>Sun, 22 Feb 2026 08:32:51 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title><![CDATA[OSI参考模型&&TCP/IP模型]]></title><link>https://blog.wrjcloud.cn/archives/osican-kao-mo-xing-tcp-ipmo-xing</link><description><![CDATA[<img src="https://blog.wrjcloud.cn/plugins/feed/assets/telemetry.gif?title=OSI%E5%8F%82%E8%80%83%E6%A8%A1%E5%9E%8B%26%26TCP%2FIP%E6%A8%A1%E5%9E%8B&amp;url=/archives/osican-kao-mo-xing-tcp-ipmo-xing" width="1" height="1" alt="" style="opacity:0;"> 本文对比了OSI参考模型与TCP/IP模型的核心架构与功能。OSI为七层理论模型（物理层至应用层），逐层规范数据传输流程，其中物理层传输比特，数据链路层确保帧纠错，网络层实现路由选择，传输层保障端到端通信，会话层管理连接连续性，表示层统一数据格式，应用层直接服务用户。TCP/IP为四层实用模型（网络接口、网络、传输、应用层），合并OSI高三级功能至应用层，以IP协议实现跨网路由，TCP/UDP提供可靠/不可靠传输。OSI强调理论完整性，TCP/IP以简化的分层架构成为互联网实际标准，两者在网络接口与传输功能上存在直接对应关系。]]></description><guid isPermaLink="false">/archives/osican-kao-mo-xing-tcp-ipmo-xing</guid><dc:creator>Administrator</dc:creator><enclosure url="https://blog.wrjcloud.cn/apis/api.storage.halo.run/v1alpha1/thumbnails/-/via-uri?uri=%2Fupload%2Fp3-pffB.png&amp;size=m" type="image/jpeg" length="274642"/><pubDate>Wed, 4 Feb 2026 15:52:04 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title><![CDATA[ZGSF-Linux-Web2（灵境）]]></title><link>https://blog.wrjcloud.cn/archives/zgsf-linux-web2-ling-jing</link><description><![CDATA[<img src="https://blog.wrjcloud.cn/plugins/feed/assets/telemetry.gif?title=ZGSF-Linux-Web2%EF%BC%88%E7%81%B5%E5%A2%83%EF%BC%89&amp;url=/archives/zgsf-linux-web2-ling-jing" width="1" height="1" alt="" style="opacity:0;"> 该靶机源自知攻善防实验室，部署于灵境靶场平台，模拟Webshell入侵应急响应场景。用户需通过SSH（root/zgsf2025）登录后分析服务器日志、数据库及流量包（如wireshark解析pcap文件），查找攻击路径、木马文件version2.php及7项flag。关键步骤包括：定位攻击IP（192.168.20.1）、解密数据库中管理员密码（Network@2020）、提取Webshell连接URL及密码（Network2020）、解析env及日志获取flag2/flag3。注意靶机存在非预期解，建议关闭防护专注排查流程。]]></description><guid isPermaLink="false">/archives/zgsf-linux-web2-ling-jing</guid><dc:creator>Administrator</dc:creator><enclosure url="https://blog.wrjcloud.cn/apis/api.storage.halo.run/v1alpha1/thumbnails/-/via-uri?uri=%2Fupload%2F%25E3%2580%2590%25E5%2593%25B2%25E9%25A3%258E%25E5%25A3%2581%25E7%25BA%25B8%25E3%2580%2591%25E6%25B5%25AA%25E6%25B6%259B-%25E6%25B5%25B7%25E5%25B2%25B8-%25E6%25B5%25B7%25E6%2599%25AF.png&amp;size=m" type="image/jpeg" length="380194"/><category>漏洞靶场</category><pubDate>Mon, 2 Feb 2026 15:50:19 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title><![CDATA[ZGSF-Windows-Web3（灵境）]]></title><link>https://blog.wrjcloud.cn/archives/zgsf-windows-web3</link><description><![CDATA[<img src="https://blog.wrjcloud.cn/plugins/feed/assets/telemetry.gif?title=ZGSF-Windows-Web3%EF%BC%88%E7%81%B5%E5%A2%83%EF%BC%89&amp;url=/archives/zgsf-windows-web3" width="1" height="1" alt="" style="opacity:0;"> 本靶机为ZGSF-Windows-Web3，部署于灵境靶场平台（需版本≥0.4.5），模拟政务服务器遭WebShell入侵的应急响应场景。连接时，Windows用户需用SSH 22端口（账号Administrator，密码2025@LingJing），禁用3389远程连接。核心任务包含三部分：1. 溯源攻击IP 192.168.75.129和130，通过Apache日志分析获取；2. 排查隐藏用户"hack6618$"（以$结尾，需通过注册表或管理工具识别）；3. 提取三个Flag：系统目录的system.bat文件含flag{888666abc}，任务计划程序中flag{zgsfsys@sec}，以及通过重置Z-Blog后台密码在用户资料中找到flag{H@Ck@sec}。攻击链分析显示，入侵者利用Z-Blog漏洞植入cmd.php，创建隐藏账户并部署计划任务维持持久化控制。通关需通过题解程序验证三要素，强调日志分析、权限排查及Web渗透的核心技能。]]></description><guid isPermaLink="false">/archives/zgsf-windows-web3</guid><dc:creator>Administrator</dc:creator><enclosure url="https://blog.wrjcloud.cn/apis/api.storage.halo.run/v1alpha1/thumbnails/-/via-uri?uri=%2Fupload%2F%25E3%2580%2590%25E5%2593%25B2%25E9%25A3%258E%25E5%25A3%2581%25E7%25BA%25B8%25E3%2580%2591%25E4%25BA%258C%25E6%25AC%25A1%25E5%2585%2583-%25E5%2590%258D%25E4%25BE%25A6%25E6%258E%25A2%25E6%259F%25AF%25E5%258D%2597.png&amp;size=m" type="image/jpeg" length="285088"/><category>漏洞靶场</category><pubDate>Sat, 31 Jan 2026 17:12:49 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title><![CDATA[pikachu靶场通关全流程]]></title><link>https://blog.wrjcloud.cn/archives/pikachuba-chang-ji-lu</link><description><![CDATA[<img src="https://blog.wrjcloud.cn/plugins/feed/assets/telemetry.gif?title=pikachu%E9%9D%B6%E5%9C%BA%E9%80%9A%E5%85%B3%E5%85%A8%E6%B5%81%E7%A8%8B&amp;url=/archives/pikachuba-chang-ji-lu" width="1" height="1" alt="" style="opacity:0;">本文详细介绍了Pikachu靶场的安装部署与实战教程。作为网络安全领域知名平台，Pikachu提供丰富的漏洞模拟环境。文章首先通过Docker完成靶场安装，配置国内镜像源并启动服务，接着从华为云拉取镜像并运行容器。核心内容涵盖十余种常见Web漏洞实战，包括暴力破解（验证码绕过、Token防爆破）、XSS（反射型、存储型、DOM型）、CSRF、SQL注入（数字型、字符型、盲注）、RCE、文件包含、文件上传绕过、越权漏洞、目录遍历、敏感信息泄露、PHP反序列化、XXE、URL重定向和SSRF等。每种漏洞均配有详细说明和实操演示，直观展示漏洞成因与攻击利用过程，为网络安全学习提供系统性实践平台。]]></description><guid isPermaLink="false">/archives/pikachuba-chang-ji-lu</guid><dc:creator>Administrator</dc:creator><enclosure url="https://blog.wrjcloud.cn/apis/api.storage.halo.run/v1alpha1/thumbnails/-/via-uri?uri=%2Fupload%2F%25E3%2580%2590%25E5%2593%25B2%25E9%25A3%258E%25E5%25A3%2581%25E7%25BA%25B8%25E3%2580%2591%25E5%258F%25AF%25E7%2588%25B1-%25E5%25B0%258F%25E7%2586%258A-%25E5%25B0%258F%25E7%258B%2597.png&amp;size=m" type="image/jpeg" length="898252"/><category>漏洞靶场</category><pubDate>Fri, 16 Jan 2026 12:33:51 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title><![CDATA[RCE_labs通关教程（下）]]></title><link>https://blog.wrjcloud.cn/archives/rce_labstong-guan-jiao-cheng-xia</link><description><![CDATA[<img src="https://blog.wrjcloud.cn/plugins/feed/assets/telemetry.gif?title=RCE_labs%E9%80%9A%E5%85%B3%E6%95%99%E7%A8%8B%EF%BC%88%E4%B8%8B%EF%BC%89&amp;url=/archives/rce_labstong-guan-jiao-cheng-xia" width="1" height="1" alt="" style="opacity:0;">本文介绍了RCE-labs靶场的多个关卡解题思路，涵盖PHP远程代码执行的核心技术。靶场通过14个关卡（level_14-27）系统化训练RCE能力，包括7字符/5字符长度限制RCE、反弹shell、环境变量注入、文件写入与包含、PHP特性利用等。解题方法多样，如通配符绕过、沙盒环境利用、PHP函数特性（动态调用、自增操作、无参命令执行）、取反/异或编码绕过WAF等。每个关卡均提供详细代码分析和实战案例，帮助理解命令执行原理及绕过技巧，是提升PHP安全实战能力的优质资源。]]></description><guid isPermaLink="false">/archives/rce_labstong-guan-jiao-cheng-xia</guid><dc:creator>Administrator</dc:creator><enclosure url="https://blog.wrjcloud.cn/apis/api.storage.halo.run/v1alpha1/thumbnails/-/via-uri?uri=%2Fupload%2FSnipaste_2025-12-03_22-24-02.png&amp;size=m" type="image/jpeg" length="292201"/><category>漏洞靶场</category><pubDate>Thu, 1 Jan 2026 12:50:36 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title><![CDATA[RCE_labs通关教程（上）]]></title><link>https://blog.wrjcloud.cn/archives/rce_labstong-guan-jiao-cheng</link><description><![CDATA[<img src="https://blog.wrjcloud.cn/plugins/feed/assets/telemetry.gif?title=RCE_labs%E9%80%9A%E5%85%B3%E6%95%99%E7%A8%8B%EF%BC%88%E4%B8%8A%EF%BC%89&amp;url=/archives/rce_labstong-guan-jiao-cheng" width="1" height="1" alt="" style="opacity:0;">本文介绍了RCE-labs靶场的前13个关卡，涵盖PHP代码执行和命令执行漏洞的实战练习。靶场通过不同难度的关卡，系统展示了常见RCE漏洞的利用方法：包括eval()直接执行代码、assert等回调函数绕过、系统命令执行、WAF过滤绕过技术（如通配符、特殊字符、八进制/二进制编码）等。每个关卡提供详细代码解析和具体payload，帮助学习者掌握从基础代码执行到高级无字母命令执行的攻防技巧，是提升Web安全实战能力的优质学习资源。]]></description><guid isPermaLink="false">/archives/rce_labstong-guan-jiao-cheng</guid><dc:creator>Administrator</dc:creator><enclosure url="https://blog.wrjcloud.cn/apis/api.storage.halo.run/v1alpha1/thumbnails/-/via-uri?uri=%2Fupload%2FSnipaste_2025-12-03_01-31-05.png&amp;size=m" type="image/jpeg" length="157981"/><category>漏洞靶场</category><pubDate>Sun, 28 Dec 2025 16:43:42 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title><![CDATA[SQL注入攻击的深度研究]]></title><link>https://blog.wrjcloud.cn/archives/sqlzhu-ru-gong-ji-de-shen-du-yan-jiu</link><description><![CDATA[<img src="https://blog.wrjcloud.cn/plugins/feed/assets/telemetry.gif?title=SQL%E6%B3%A8%E5%85%A5%E6%94%BB%E5%87%BB%E7%9A%84%E6%B7%B1%E5%BA%A6%E7%A0%94%E7%A9%B6&amp;url=/archives/sqlzhu-ru-gong-ji-de-shen-du-yan-jiu" width="1" height="1" alt="" style="opacity:0;">SQL注入是利用未过滤用户输入拼接恶意SQL语句的Web安全漏洞，可绕过认证、窃取篡改数据甚至控制服务器，属OWASP十大威胁之一。其产生需用户输入接口、字符串拼接及恶意语句被执行三个条件，分类包括WHERE子句、UNION、堆叠查询、盲注等，不同数据库攻击手法有差异。防范核心是分离SQL语句与用户输入，最有效方法是参数化查询（预编译结构），辅以白名单验证、数据类型检查等输入验证，并需建立从编码、框架到数据库、网络的多层深度防御体系，彻底摒弃字符串拼接陋习。]]></description><guid isPermaLink="false">/archives/sqlzhu-ru-gong-ji-de-shen-du-yan-jiu</guid><dc:creator>Administrator</dc:creator><enclosure url="https://blog.wrjcloud.cn/apis/api.storage.halo.run/v1alpha1/thumbnails/-/via-uri?uri=%2Fupload%2F%25E3%2580%2590%25E5%2593%25B2%25E9%25A3%258E%25E5%25A3%2581%25E7%25BA%25B8%25E3%2580%2591%25E4%25BA%258C%25E6%25AC%25A1%25E5%2585%2583-%25E5%258A%25A8%25E6%25BC%25AB%25E5%25A5%25B3%25E5%25AD%25A9.png&amp;size=m" type="image/jpeg" length="576107"/><category>漏洞研究</category><pubDate>Wed, 24 Dec 2025 13:44:25 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title><![CDATA[CVE-2017-12615漏洞复现]]></title><link>https://blog.wrjcloud.cn/archives/cve-2017-12615lou-dong-fu-xian</link><description><![CDATA[<img src="https://blog.wrjcloud.cn/plugins/feed/assets/telemetry.gif?title=CVE-2017-12615%E6%BC%8F%E6%B4%9E%E5%A4%8D%E7%8E%B0&amp;url=/archives/cve-2017-12615lou-dong-fu-xian" width="1" height="1" alt="" style="opacity:0;">Apache Tomcat存在CVE-2017-12615高危漏洞，因启用HTTP PUT方法且运行于Windows主机时，攻击者可构造恶意请求绕过安全检查，上传JSP webshell文件，进而执行任意代码获取服务器权限。复现时需通过斜杠、空格或NTFS数据流绕过DefaultServlet的只读限制，成功写入恶意JSP后连接即可控制服务器。修复方案包括升级至安全版本、恢复web.xml中DefaultServlet的readonly默认值为true、禁用PUT方法或部署WAF防护，同时遵循最小权限原则降低风险。]]></description><guid isPermaLink="false">/archives/cve-2017-12615lou-dong-fu-xian</guid><dc:creator>Administrator</dc:creator><enclosure url="https://blog.wrjcloud.cn/apis/api.storage.halo.run/v1alpha1/thumbnails/-/via-uri?uri=%2Fupload%2F%25E3%2580%2590%25E5%2593%25B2%25E9%25A3%258E%25E5%25A3%2581%25E7%25BA%25B8%25E3%2580%25918k-%25E5%258A%25A8%25E6%25BC%25AB-%25E5%25B0%2591%25E5%25A5%25B3.png&amp;size=m" type="image/jpeg" length="531049"/><category>漏洞复现</category><pubDate>Fri, 19 Dec 2025 18:47:47 GMT</pubDate></item></channel></rss>